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Nature shall be secured against deg­
radation caused by warfare or other 
hostile activities” (Cultural Norms, 
War and the Environment [CNWE], 
p. 169; Environmental Warfare 
[EW], p. 10). Natural resources 
“shall not be utilized in excess of 
their natural capacity for regener­
ation” (Global Resources and Inter­
national Conflict [GRIC], p. 193). 
So enjoins the World Charter for
322
Nature, a document promulgated by 
the United Nations, signed by 112 
states. Here are five remarkable and 
sobering volumes, edited by Arthur 
H. Westing and with dozens of con­
tributors, that explore in detail the 
extent to which biological conserva­
tion can succeed in the face of war 
and international competition for re­
sources. These studies are the work 
of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, which is fi­
nanced by the Swedish Parliament 
and has an international staff, gov­
erning board, and scientific council. 
The articles grow out of symposia 
held in recent years.
Westing fears that something 
about increasingly developed civili­
zation exacerbates bellicosity. The 
tendency to make war is not deter­
mined by genetics nor is it common 
to all humans; rather, it is a social 
force arising from an expanding and 
increasingly consumptive popula­
tion in which desires escalate faster 
than resources can be developed to 
satisfy them. So the mismatch grows 
worse, and wars result {CNWE, pp. 
4-5). “Human beings fight not be­
cause they are biologically impelled, 
but because they are culturally in­
duced and because their ecological 
equilibrium is disturbed seriously 
enough to make substantial change 
necessary” {GRIC, p. 166).
This claim is extensively explored 
in Cultural Norms, War, and the 
Environment Geoffrey Best (Inter­
national Relations, London School of 
Economics and Political Science) 
fears that the impact of war on the 
environment is such a novel threat
that the cultural norms of the past 
are inadequate to address the prob­
lem. “From the first syllable of re­
corded time until 1945, the making 
of war — even the most total and 
deadly of wars — included no seri­
ous capability of permanently dam­
aging the natural environment” 
{CNWE, p. 19). Still, he finds in the 
norms of the past some principles of 
restraint that may help in the future.
Grigori S. Khozin (Scientific 
Council for Philosophical and Social 
Problems of Science and Technol­
ogy, Moscow) explains the Soviet 
policy. With the coming of the so­
cialist revolution and the Decree of 
Land, “All of the land — including its 
underground riches, w ater re ­
sources, forests and other endow­
ments of nature — were to be de­
clared national property and taken 
under control of the state on behalf 
of all the people” {CNWE, p. 35). 
The Soviets plan for “continuous op­
timization of nature utilization” to 
solve “the problem of the recon­
struction o f the biosphere in the in­
terests o f freely thinking humanity 
as a single totality” {CNWE, p. 36, 
p. 42, emphasis in text). Such a per­
spective is thoroughly humanistic 
and idealistic, oblivious to concerns 
such as those expressed in the 
World Charter fo r Nature, which 
states that “every form of life is 
unique, warranting respect regard­
less of its worth to man” {CNWE, p. 
78). Even on his anthropocentric 
terms, Khozin says little about either 
the serious domestic Soviet environ­
mental problems or those posed by 
international militarism.
Conservation Biology
Volume 3, No. 3, September 1989
This content downloaded from 129.82.134.143 on Wed, 15 Jul 2020 15:16:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Book Reviews 323
Christopher Stone (Law Center, 
University of Southern California) 
analyzes the interplay between cul­
tural norms and international law. A 
cultural norm operates inside a cul­
ture, within a nation, and restrains 
individual persons from theft, mur­
der, adultery, and so on. Cultural 
norms may differ from culture to 
culture. International law relates 
cultures to each other; it is between 
nations. It does not regulate the ac­
tions of persons but of nation-states. 
Persons do not make or break trea­
ties; nations do. Nations are not real­
ly moral agents like persons are. In­
tracultural norms extrapolate poorly 
to produce intercultural norms. Na­
tions break treaties in times of des­
peration, and they keep them only in 
a climate of rationality where they 
perceive certain mutual benefits to 
all parties, even during hostilities. 
Moral standards operate within cul­
tures, but wars are times of moral as 
well as rational breakdown. Interna­
tional law will be weak at best; it 
must work at a level above cultural 
norms, and in different ways (CNWE\ 
p. 72).
Virginia Held (Philosophy, City 
University of New York) thinks that 
the root of the problem is male so­
ciety, which dominates both nature 
and women, though this maleness is 
more a cultural norm than a genetic 
tendency. Mothering is pacific, but 
violence is manly (CNWE\ p. 46). 
Birgit Brock-Utne (Institute for Edu­
cational Research, University of 
Oslo) worries that those with the 
most education pose the greatest 
threat of causing war. Something in 
the educational system promotes 
war. History books teach that vio­
lence succeeds; they render invisi­
ble the work of the peacemakers. 
Natural science is taught as the 
conquest of nature, and even the 
educational system itself is com­
petitive more often than coopera­
tive. Students compete for the 
highest grades, rather than assis­
ting each other in shared learning. 
Power in politics and in technol­
ogy is interpreted as power over
another and not power to an appro­
priate, respectful end (CNWE\ p. 
84). These are the masculine themes 
lamented by Held, but Brock-Utne 
develops them without the gender 
emphasis.
David M. Rubin (Center for War, 
Peace, and the News Media at New 
York University) asks whether the 
mass media can monitor govern­
ment despite the secrecy inevitable 
in war and preparation for war, es­
pecially since the advent of high 
technology. Further, even in societ­
ies with a supposedly free press, the 
government has considerable power 
to persuade and control the press. 
Another seriously biasing factor is 
that the media are themselves 
deeply embedded in the capitalist 
system that drives the war-making 
tendency and that needs so steadily 
to be criticized.
Rosalind J. Marsh (Russian Stud­
ies, University of Exeter) notes how 
the arts glorified war, at least until 
the second half of the twentieth cen­
tury. Sometimes artists needed to 
please the aristocratic patrons who 
supported them. More recently, 
however, art has been more effec­
tive than journalism in protesting 
against social tendencies to make 
war, although neither art nor jour­
nalism can claim seriously to be a 
determinant of national policies on 
war.
Herbicides in War (HW) is a sum­
mary report of the International 
Symposium on Herbicides and Defo­
liants in War: The Long-term Effects 
on Man and Nature, held in Vietnam 
in 1983. This symposium was at­
tended by over 130 scientists, about 
one-third from Vietnam and the rest 
from nearly two dozen other coun­
tries. The book consists of the brief, 
compact reports of working groups 
in various areas of concern. The 
eight reports are written by over 
thirty Vietnamese and Western sci­
entists, who sum up the conclusions 
of the dozen or so persons in each 
group. The reports are also based on 
field trips made during the sympo­
sium and on much laboratory and
earlier fieldwork. The first half of the 
book examines effects on terrestrial 
plant ecology and forestry, on ter­
restrial animal ecology, on soils, and 
on coastal, aquatic, and marine ecol­
ogy. The second half turns to effects 
on humans, considering links be­
tween herbicides, cancer, and birth 
defects.
Although chemicals have been 
used occasionally against human 
populations and natural systems 
since ancient times, when fields 
were plowed and sown with salt, the 
Vietnam War is the only war in 
which there has been a profligate 
use of herbicides, in this case by a 
technologically advanced nation to 
subdue a peasant army. Three herbi­
cides, codenamed Agents Blue, Or­
ange, and White, were sprayed over 
large areas, sometimes to destroy 
crops but primarily to defoliate trees 
and deprive the enemy of cover. 
About 1.7 million hectares were 
sprayed, often more than once (HW, 
pp. 3—23).
Most of these herbicides break 
down within a few months, but it 
does not follow that the ecological 
effects are short-term. Dioxins are 
notorious impurities in Agent Or­
ange, can be quite toxic, and persist 
in appreciable quantities for a de­
cade or more. Even when the herbi­
cides them selves break down 
quickly there are long-term effects, 
since ecosystem processes, once dis­
rupted, cannot reestablish them­
selves. The needed seeds are not 
available, soils become eroded, 
weedy species invade, the natives 
cannot compete with weeds, and 
degradation results. In general the 
effects of the herbicides on the for­
ests, especially the coastal mangrove 
forests, has proven to be indisput­
able and tragic, even a decade later. 
The regenerated forests are depau­
perate, diminished not only in their 
botanical richness, but in their wild­
life. As a result of habitat destruc­
tion, the birds and small and large 
animals are gone, and some of these 
forests may not be reestablished in 
less than a century, if ever.
Conservation Biology
Volume 3, No. 3, September 1989
This content downloaded from 129.82.134.143 on Wed, 15 Jul 2020 15:16:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
324 Book Reviews
If the forests are not restored nat­
urally, perhaps they can be reestab­
lished by human intervention. This 
is more likely than natural regener­
ation, but the necessary resources 
are not available in Vietnam, where 
life is already marginal. The ruined 
forest land may since have been con­
verted to agricultural use, which is 
usually a bad tradeoff overall, but 
difficult now to reverse socially or 
biologically. Even had the Vietnam­
ese the wealth to do so, assisted per­
haps by other nations, rebuilding a 
destroyed ecosystem takes more 
knowledge than we now have. The 
richest forests were often affected 
most severely. Marine ecosystems 
were also affected, with a reduction 
in the diversity of fish species, lower 
fish biomass and productivity, and 
the invasion of undesirable fish spe­
cies.
Information on the effects of these 
herbicides on humans is less conclu­
sive, but ample evidence indicates 
that here, too, the consequences 
were tragic. One problem is that sci­
entifically controlled studies are 
harder to make on humans; humans 
are mobile, and there are ethical re­
straints. The causal links are present, 
but they are long-term and statisti­
cal, and, as we remember from stud­
ies of smoking and lung cancer in 
the West, this kind of connection, 
showing up over decades and ex­
pressed in terms of probability, is 
more evasive and disputable than 
the evidence of a ruined forest that 
all can see.
One is struck by how technology, 
in this case the technology of war, 
escalates ignorance faster than it es­
calates knowledge (to say nothing of 
the fact that wisdom seems to atro­
phy proportionately). The power to 
produce changes escalates faster 
than our knowledge of the results of 
our changes. We are still trying to 
figure out all the consequences of 
our actions, but at the time we 
thought we were just defoliating to 
rob the enemy of cover. We pro­
duced changes we were then quite 
ignorant of, and in many cases we
remain ignorant. And we are even 
more ignorant of how to repair the 
undesirable effects. It is easy to 
break something that you do not 
have the money or know-how to fix.
A lesson to learn is that we cannot 
know what we are doing until we 
know what we are undoing. In the 
end, one is shocked by the arro­
gance and tragedy of these masters 
of war (though they failed in the war 
as well), who were so callous and 
ignorant about the long-term effects 
of what they were doing to the 
fauna, the flora, and human health 
and civilization. The Vietnam War 
was nearly two decades ago, but is 
there any reason to think that the 
contemporary masters of war, with 
their fingers on the nuclear trigger, 
are any wiser?
Explosive Rem nants o f  War 
{ERW) assesses the environmental 
effects of high-explosive munitions 
that remain after wars — for exam­
ple, mines, booby traps, dud shells, 
bombs, and grenades. These are 
scattered across the countryside in 
incredible numbers — an estimated 
2 million bombs, 23 million artillery 
shells, and tens of millions of other 
explosives in Vietnam, including 
thousands of mines in harbors and 
navigable waters {ERW, p. 3). In 
large regions of Indochina scarcely a 
family has escaped a death or maim­
ing caused by previously unex­
ploded munitions {ERW, p. 7). 
About 80 percent of Poland was 
mined in World War II, and from 
1945 to 1988 over 88 million explo­
sive remnants were neutralized 
{ERW, p. 20).
Khairi Sgaier (University of Al- 
fateh, Tripoli) examines the effect of 
such munitions on agricultural de­
velopment in Libya, which was heav­
ily mined by the Germans and Brit­
ish from 1940-1943. Earl S. Martin 
and Murray Hiebert (Mennonite 
Central Committee, Akron, Pennsyl­
vania) look at the effects in Vietnam. 
Others examine demolition on land 
and at sea in detail, including, inter­
estingly, the use of dogs whose keen 
scent can detect buried munitions.
Environmental Warfare turns to 
the future — with a shudder. What 
possible environmental modifica­
tions should we fear, and how can 
we avoid them? The first part of the 
book examines modifications now 
technologically possible or that 
seem likely to become so in the de­
cades ahead. Erno Meszaros (Insti­
tu te for A tmospheric Physics, 
Budapest) and Hallan C. Noltimier 
(Geology and Mineralogy, Ohio 
State University) explore possible 
techniques for manipulating the at­
mosphere and geosphere (land­
scapes, ecosystems, drainage pat­
terns). The most plausible involve 
steering storms, creating snow ava­
lanches and landslides, modifying 
permafrost areas, diverting and pol­
luting rivers, destroying dams, and 
making rain or snow {EW, p. 69).
A historical instance of environ­
mental warfare took place on June, 
1938, when the Chinese Nationalists 
(Kuomintang) dynamited the Hua- 
yuankow dike of the Yellow River 
(Huang He) near Chengchow to 
curtail the Japanese advance. This 
killed more people than any other 
single act in human history, to say 
nothing of the effect on the land­
scape. Four or five times as many 
persons died as when the atomic 
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. In 
the resulting flooding, several hun­
dred thousand Chinese died, along 
with several thousand Japanese sol­
diers. The masters of war failed again 
{EW, p. 6).
There are about seventy huge 
dams in twenty countries, and the 
potential for disaster should these 
dams be destroyed is almost unimag­
inable. Another devastating possibil­
ity is deliberate radioactive contam­
ination by destruction of any of the 
300 or so nuclear power generating 
stations. This could make landscapes 
uninhabitable for centuries.
The second part of Environmen­
tal Warfare deals with political ef­
forts to prevent such environmental 
devastation. Jozef Goldblat (Stock­
holm International Peace Research 
Institute) and Allan S. Krass (School
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of Natural Science, Hampshire Col­
lege) examine the Environmental 
Modification (Enmod) Convention 
of 1977 and also devote some atten­
tion to the Geneva Protocol I of 
1977. Their general verdict is that 
the Enmod Convention is “an ambig­
uous and cumbersome instrument 
of modest value” {EW, p. 87); the 
nations involved, especially the 
great powers, only agreed not to do 
what was technologically impossible 
or what they have no intention of 
doing anyway, such as employing 
types of environmental modification 
that are hardly rational because they 
are about as likely to harm one side 
as the other.
One major flaw is that the Con­
vention only prohibits environmen­
tal modification directly targeted at 
the environment. Thus, use of mis­
siles that would result in nuclear 
winter is not even prohibited, since 
the target of weapons is enemy mil­
itary or industrial capabilities, and 
the destruction of nature is only a 
side effect {EW, p. 38). The authors 
offer some constructive suggestions 
about how the Enmod Convention 
might be amended and extended to 
be more effective.
The record of the United States is 
not especially to be admired. The 
one negative vote cast against the 
World Charter for Nature (118 na­
tions in favor) was by the United 
States, the only nation that has relied 
on large-scale systematic environ­
mental warfare in a recent conflict 
{EW, p. 38). During the negotiations 
preceding the Enmod Convention, 
the Soviets proposed (and other na­
tions desired) a more comprehen­
sive prohibition of environmental 
modification than the United States 
would accept (EW, pp. 56-57). The 
United States agreed to refrain only 
from environmental modifications 
considered to be “widespread, long- 
lasting, or severe.” Whether viola­
tions have in fact occurred at this 
level is a decision reserved for the 
United Nations Security Council, on 
which the United States carries the
power of veto {EW, pp. 60-61, p. 
72). The United States claims that it 
has only agreed not to use environ­
mental modification techniques, but 
that it can nonetheless research and 
develop them, on the grounds that 
these techniques also have peaceful 
uses. The United States has not be­
come a party to the Geneva Protocol 
I of 1977, which contains several ar­
ticles protecting the natural envi­
ronment, nor has it signed the Law 
of the Sea Convention of 1982 
{GRIC, 185).
Global Resources and Interna­
tional Conflict shows how the geo­
graphical distribution, availability, 
and degradation of the world’s nat­
ural resources influence the interna­
tional security perceptions that gov­
ern strategic policies and the use of 
military force. Global deficiencies, 
coupled with uneven distribution of 
resources, can lead to insecurity, un­
stable alliances, national rivalries, 
and eventually to war. The natural 
resources of the earth, both living 
and nonliving, are quite unevenly 
distributed, partly due to natural 
processes, but partly for a variety of 
other reasons: what counts as a re­
source shifts with available technol­
ogy; political boundaries are seldom 
drawn with any intelligent relation 
to geography, much less to ecosys­
tems; nations are of diverse sizes, 
have different kinds of governments, 
and are in different stages of devel­
opment; there is no international 
governmental authority, only loose 
coalitions of nations each acting in 
its own national interest.
Of the world’s resources, oil and 
natural gas are examined by Alex­
ander A. Arbatov (Institute for Sys­
tems Studies, Moscow), Erik Solem 
(Canadian Department of External 
Affairs), and Antony F. G. Scanlan 
(British Institute of Energy Econom­
ics). Helge Hveem (University of 
Oslo) examines minerals. Malin 
Falkenmark (Natural Sciences Re­
search Council, Stockholm) exam­
ines fresh waters, Susan B. Peterson 
(Institute for Employment Policy,
Boston University) and John M. Teal 
(Woods Hole Oceanographic Insti­
tution) assess ocean fisheries. Peter 
Wallensteen (Peace and Conflict Re­
search, Uppsala University) assesses 
food crops, and Marcel Leroy (Social 
Sciences, University College of Cape 
B reton) exam ines popula tion  
growth.
No nation is fully self-sufficient in 
all of the natural resources that it 
desires or needs, and some have 
very few resources. Most national 
boundaries predate any interest in 
oil, for instance; known global re­
serves of oil are highly concen­
trated; one-quarter are in Saudi Ara­
bia alone and more than half are in 
the Middle East as a whole {GRIC, 
pp. 11-12). Over 400 million peo­
ple in various nations of the world 
are seriously undernourished, yet “it 
is a recurrent pattern that, in the 
midst of starvation, there is food 
available either in the area hit, in 
neighbouring territories, or in the 
global community at large” {GRIC, 
pp. 143-45).
With the growth of populations, 
the land base in effect shrinks. “At 
the turn of the century there were 
nine hectares per person, at the end 
of World War II six, and today 
(1986) three; by the year 2000 
there will be but two” {GRIC, p. 7). 
The biomass of humans plus that of 
their livestock has displaced more 
than 20 percent of all the terrestrial 
animal biomass, and this will grow 
to 40 percent in four decades. Given 
the already inequitable distribution 
of resources, there is great pressure 
to exploit not only all suitable arable 
land but marginal and fragile lands as 
well. That does not bode well for 
those who love wildlife and who 
wish to preserve a place for wildness 
in the next millennium.
The human activity that consumes 
most water is agriculture, which 
currently accounts for some 75 per­
cent of global water use. It is not 
uncommon for 70 percent or more 
of the water withdrawn from rivers 
or aquifers for irrigation to not
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reach the crop (GRIC, p. 87). This 
does not bode well for those who 
love riparian zones and endangered 
fishes. Though many marine fishes 
occur in continental waters, many 
exist in deep sea waters under no 
national jurisdiction, andit is doubt­
ful in such circumstances that hu­
mans can be prudent enough to take 
a harvest in renewable proportions. 
A tragedy of the commons seems 
more likely, and this bodes ill for 
those who love the sea and its life.
None of this promotes intelligent 
biological conservation on regional 
and global scales; to the contrary,
everywhere culture must be super­
imposed on nature, but when cul­
tures are unjust and irrational, natu­
ral systems suffer in result.
Throughout the series, the articles 
are on the whole perceptive, reason­
ably tight, and short, and they ap­
pear to be reliable surveys of the 
fields they investigate. All are ade­
quately referenced, and there are 
useful appendices and bibliogra­
phies. There are some stuffy places, 
as when Richard Falk (Politics, 
Princeton University) writes of 
“the delegitimation of nuclear 
weaponry” as an “important shift ...
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occurring in the tectonic plates of 
civilizational orientation” (C^WE, 
pp. 53, p. 61). He means that more 
and more people think that using 
nuclear arms is neither sane nor 
right.
This is an important series and 
demonstrates beyond doubt that 
anyone committed to biological 
conservation must also take serious 
interest in the political and social is­
sues related to international conflict.
Holmes Rolston, III
Colorado State University 
Fort Collins, CO 80523, U.S.A.
